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Abstract
Crowdfunding has become an important research
area, but we know little about how rewards influence
fundraising success. This research-in-progress studies
reward-based crowdfunding through a behavioraleconomics lens. We draw on dual-process theory and
provide preliminary evidence for the middle-option
bias in crowdfunding. Two empirical studies in a simple, controlled environment confirm the significance of
the middle-option bias, both for varying numbers of
donation options and for varying price ranges. Since
our findings suggest that the positioning of rewards in
a menu of rewards can influence support behavior and
how much money project creators collect, they can
inform the design of crowdfunding projects. Our future
research will develop a mock crowdfunding website to
study the middle-option bias in a more realistic environment.

1. Introduction
Crowdfunding is the practice of collecting small
amounts of money for entrepreneurial, charitable, or
creative projects from a large number of people, typically moderated by Internet websites [3]. Rewardbased crowdfunding, implemented by popular websites
like Kickstarter and Indiegogo, has become particularly common on the Internet [37]. A distinct feature of
reward-based crowdfunding websites is that, while
backers do not receive anything financial (e.g., shares
or interest) in return for their money, they can receive
non-monetary rewards, such as the chance to prepurchase the product or to receive tokens of appreciation (e.g., autographs or meet-and-greets) [7].
With its broad adoption in practice, the rewardbased model of crowdfunding is receiving increasing
attention from researchers [32]. In particular, researchers have studied what determines fundraising success,
including project design and description, networking
effects and communication behavior, and the project
creators’ experience and background [e.g., 22, 30, 31,
37]. Still, crowdfunding research remains in its infan-
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cy, and several research gaps remain [32]. In particular,
with few exceptions [e.g., 26, 51], the design of reward
menus has seldom been studied. While some researchers have found that the number of rewards influences
fundraising success [e.g., 31], the selection of reward
tiers and the determination of the donation amounts to
which they are connected have not been studied in sufficient depth.
Against this background, this research-in-progress
studies the design of reward menus through a behavioral-economics lens. We present preliminary results
from two empirical studies—an experimental study
and an observational study—and hypothesize that the
positioning of rewards in a reward menu influences
backers’ decisions. Specifically, we provide preliminary evidence for the middle-option bias [16, 49] in
crowdfunding, so our results suggest that project creators may have a way to position rewards that collects
more money and reaches funding targets more quickly.
This early-stage research focuses on internal validity
by isolating the middle-option bias in a simple, controlled environment, and our future research will test
the middle-option bias in a more realistic environment
to establish ecological validity.
Section 2 provides background on reward-based
crowdfunding, and Section 3 reviews related work.
Section 4 explains the middle-option bias and presents
the paper’s hypotheses. Section 5 explains the overall
research design, and Sections 6 and 7 present the results from the two empirical studies. Section 8 discusses implications and limitations and provides an outlook
on future research.

2. Reward-based crowdfunding
Crowdfunding is big business. The crowdfunding
industry grew from $6.1 billion in 2013 to $16.2 billion
in 2014 and to an estimated $34.4 billion in 2015 [36].
Many thousands of crowdfunding projects have been
funded successfully, and over one hundred of them
have raised more than $1 million [50]. An ongoing
crowdfunding initiative for the video game Star Citizen
had collected more than $124.1 million funds at last
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count [43]. With its broad success in practice, crowdfunding has become a hot research topic in the area of
crowd science [38], triggering research in disciplines
like entrepreneurship, management, finance, marketing, and information systems [10]. Even so, a common
definition of crowdfunding has not yet emerged, although several researchers have offered definitions and
conceptualizations [11]. Many researchers have discussed the meaning of crowdfunding based on the
closely related term “crowdsourcing” [1], which refers
to outsourcing jobs or tasks to a large, often anonymous group of people (the “crowd”) in the form of an
open call [25]. Crowdsourcing often follows the idea of
the “wisdom of the crowd,” according to which collective ideas and judgments are often as good as, or even
better, than those of single individuals [44]. Against
this background, crowdfunding can be understood as a
form of micro-task crowdsourcing that collects financial instead of intellectual contributions [39].
The idea of collecting small amounts of money
from a large number of people for funding projects and
ventures is not new, similar funding approaches have
been used for centuries; for example, the Statue of Liberty was funded by small donations from American
and French people [32]. That crowdfunding has recently gained so much momentum can be attributed to the
emergence of the Internet, which allows broader participation than ever before [11].
A variety of crowdfunding websites populate the
Internet, serving as intermediaries between project
creators and the crowd and managing most of the activities involved in the crowdfunding process [24].
Crowdfunding websites usually follow one of four
models that are distinguished based on what backers
receive for their financial contributions [9]: In donation-based crowdfunding (e.g., ammado), which is
typically used to fund charity projects, backers do not
receive anything tangible in return for their money
[e.g., 13]. In lending-based crowdfunding (e.g., Kiva),
backers provide loans and usually receive interest in
return, so this model is most common for microfinance
and private credits [e.g., 14]. In equity-based crowdfunding (e.g., Crowdcube), backers receive shares,
dividends or voting rights for their money, so this
model relies on traditional investment mechanisms and
is typically used for small-business funding [e.g., 12].
The fourth model is reward-based crowdfunding (e.g.,
Kickstarter), which is in the focus of this paper.
In reward-based crowdfunding, which has become
common in the creative industries [2], backers receive
something non-financial, whether material or immaterial, in return for their money—that is, a reward. For
example, a film-funding campaign typically involves
material rewards like the chance to pre-purchase the
Blu-ray or DVD, and immaterial rewards like film

roles, visits to the film set, or thanks in the film credits.
Reward-based crowdfunding can follow either of two
basic principles: “all-or-nothing” and “keep-it-all”
[17]. Projects that follow the all-or-nothing principle
are funded only if a predefined funding goal is reached
within a set timeframe; otherwise, the backers get their
money back and the project creators receive nothing
[24]. In the keep-it-all approach, project creators receive however much they collect [9]. The all-ornothing approach is usually considered as less risky for
backers, while the keep-it-all approach is less risky
from the project creators’ viewpoint [17]. For example,
Kickstarter follows the all-or-nothing principle, while
Indiegogo allows project creators to choose between
the two alternatives.
Building on this discussion and previous definitions
[8, 37, 42], we define reward-based crowdfunding as
the practice of collecting small amounts of money—
usually to fund creative projects and usually through
the Internet—from a large number of people in the
form of an open call that follows either the all-ornothing or keep-it-all principle, in exchange for some
material or immaterial reward.

3. Related work
When crowdfunding initially emerged as a funding
practice on the Internet, much of the related research
was dedicated to equity-based crowdfunding [10], but
reward-based crowdfunding has since increasingly
received more attention [32]. Several empirical studies
have explored the factors that determine fundraising
success [e.g., 22, 30, 31]. Based on the funding principle (i.e., keep-it-all vs. all-or-nothing), success has
most often been measured either as the amount of
money collected during the funding period [e.g., 51] or
as whether the funding goal was reached during that
period [e.g., 30].
Most crowdfunding-success research has used the
project itself as the unit of analysis, so researchers have
often studied fundraising success from the perspective
of project design [32]. Crowdfunding websites typically share the same design features [30], so researchers
have used similar factors to explain fundraising success. We organize these factors into five broad categories in what follows: project size, project creator,
presentation, communication, and rewards (Table 1).
We conceptualize project size as a function of the
funding goal and the duration of fundraising. Defining
smaller projects, that is, shorter durations and lower
funding goals, has usually been found to increase the
chances of success [e.g., 30, 37], but there are also
contradicting results. For example, Frydrych et al. concluded that funding duration does not have a signifi-
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cant effect on project success [22]. The project creator’s social network, measured as his or her number of
friends on online social networks, has also been found
to influence the success of crowdfunding projects positively [37]. In addition, the creator’s own backing history—that is, the number of projects that the project
creator has backed—has been found to be significant
[54].
Table 1. Selective overview of related work
Category

Factor

Project size

Duration

[37, 52]

Funding goal

[22, 37]

Social network

[37, 52]

Backing history

[30, 54]

Visualization

[30, 31]

Project creator
Presentation

Description
Communication Updates
Rewards

References

[51, 53]

al. provided first evidence that comparably high-priced
rewards positioned at the end of the choice set lead to
significantly higher success rates [51], and Hu et al.
argued that, given two product options of similar quality but at different prices, buyers with high product valuations prefer the high-priced option, as long as they
perceive that other buyers may have low product valuations [26]. Still, even though researchers have started
to explore crowdfunding success from the viewpoint of
the reward menu’s design, we know little about how
rewards, and how they are presented, influence crowdfunding success. As the next section explains, this paper uses theory from behavioral economics to explore
how reward menus can be designed to reach funding
targets more quickly and make crowdfunding campaigns more successful.

4. Middle-option bias

[37, 51]

Posts and comments

[31, 37]

Number of rewards

[31, 51]

Pricing

[26, 51]

Presentation refers to the use of texts, images, and
videos to describe and advertise projects. Videos and
images have been found to positively influence fundraising success [30, 31], and the depth of the project
description has been identified as another success factor [51]. For example, Zhou et al. concluded that the
quality of a project’s argument is positively associated
with fundraising success [53].
On most, if not all, websites, the project description
cannot be changed after project launch, so communication like updates, blog posts, and comments, which
helps to keep backers and potential backers informed
about the project’s progress, has been found to influence fundraising success [37, 51]. For example, Kunz
et al. provided evidence that the number of blog posts
increases the chances of project success [31].
In short, researchers have found a variety of factors
that help to explain fundraising success, but the overview of related work we provided represents only a
limited account of crowdfunding research. Several
other factors that are not directly related to project design have also been studied, including gender and race
[e.g., 40]. However, despite the amount of research that
has been performed on the factors of crowdfunding
success, the most distinctive feature of reward-based
crowdfunding—rewards—has seldom been studied.
While some researchers have found that the number of
rewards influences the chances of fundraising success
[e.g., 31], the design of reward menus, including the
selection of reward tiers and the donation amounts
connected to them, has largely been neglected. Xiao et

Research in the area of behavioral economics,
which is located at the intersection of psychology and
economics, deals with decision-making, often at the
individual level [15]. Behavioral economists not only
explore utility maximization [21], but also how personal attitudes affect decision-making [4] and how
deviations from rationality can be explained [27]. To
explain the differences between normative and descriptive decision-making (i.e., decisions that do not maximize individual utility), behavioral economists have
drawn on the dual-process theory [23], which also provides the conceptual background for the present study.
According to the dual-process theory, decisions are
the result of two separate cognitive thinking processes:
“System 1” (e.g., unconscious, automatic, quick, and
effortless) and “System 2” (e.g., conscious, controlled,
slow, and effortful) [20]. Individuals often do not comprehensively search for or thoroughly interpret information because their cognitive capacity is limited and
because decision-making can be complex [35] and can
require effort [18]. To cope with these limitations,
people apply cognitive heuristics and simplified strategies—System-1 processing in the language of the dualprocess theory. For example, people tend to draw on
reference points because they provide orientation and
make it easy to make decisions quickly [41]; if no references are available, they tend to apply heuristics
[48].
The deliberate application of cognitive heuristics
and biases by modifying the “choice architecture”
[46]—also referred to as “nudging” [29]—allows peoples’ behavior to be altered in a predictable way [33].
System-1 thinking is associated with a number of wellknown cognitive biases that can be used to nudge people [33], including the herd effect (i.e., people tend to
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follow the crowd when making decisions) [34], loss
aversion (i.e., losses hurt people twice as much as
equivalent gains make them feel happy) [28], and status-quo preference (i.e., people are reluctant to change
and prefer the current state of affairs) [28].
Another well-known bias is the middle-option bias
[5, 16], which is in the focus of the present paper. The
middle-option bias, which researchers have also called
“centrality preference,” “edge avoidance,” and “the
center-stage effect,” reflects people’s tendency to select “safe” options that are positioned in the middle of
a choice set [49]. Researchers have confirmed the robustness of the middle-option bias in several application scenarios, including the process of selecting restroom stalls [16], cereal snack bars [29], and items in
supermarkets [16]. However, as several studies have
also delivered contradictory findings [6, 19], the validity of the middle-option bias in reward-based crowdfunding remains to be assessed. In this kind of crowdfunding, the middle-option bias may be at play because, from the backers’ perspective, crowdfunding
can be understood as a problem of choice: given their
willingness to support a project financially, they have
to decide how much they wish to donate based on the
rewards offered. Backers may be prone to the middleoption bias because crowdfunding campaigns often
involve innovative and novel products and rewards for
which potential backers have only limited or no reference points. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H1: Backers tend to choose the donation option in
the middle.
Confirming this hypothesis contributes to theory on
how to design and present crowdfunding projects. If
reward menus can be designed in a way that backers
select the middle option more often than any other,
project creators could reach their funding targets more
quickly. For example, they could drop low-priced rewards from the reward menu so that higher-priced rewards appear in the middle, allowing them to collect
more money from those who select the middle option.
This, of course, can only apply under certain conditions; among others, crowdfunding projects are diverse
in terms of the number of donation options they offer,
and options can vary considerably in price range [22,
51]. Therefore, we test two sub-hypotheses:
H1a: Backers tend to choose the donation option in
the middle, independent of the price range.
H1b: Backers tend to choose the donation option in
the middle, independent of the number of options.
As the next section explains, we tested hypothesis
H1a and hypothesis H1b separately in two empirical
studies.

5. Study design
To test our hypotheses, we conducted an experimental study and an observational study. The experimental study tested the significance of the middleoption bias for donation options with varying price
ranges (hypothesis H1a), while the observational study
tested the same effect for varying numbers of donation
options (hypothesis H1b). We recruited participants
from prolific.ac, an online crowdsourcing platform for
scientific studies, for both studies.
Table 2. Donation options in the two studies
5

Coins

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Experimental study: varying price ranges
Book
Cheap
Moderate
Expensive
Movie
Cheap
Moderate
Expensive
Video game
Cheap
Moderate
Expensive
Observational study: varying numbers of options
3 options
5 options
7 options

At the beginning of each study, we provided participants with general information concerning tasks and
payment, followed by three fictitious crowdfunding
scenarios of similar length and structure. The three
scenarios featured crowdfunding for a book, a movie,
and a video game, respectively, so they represented
three of Kickstarter’s most common project categories:
publishing, film and video, and games. The description
of the three projects, for which we used Qualtrics for
presentation purposes, was based on several successful
Kickstarter campaigns [see 45 for a more detailed description of the three project scenarios]. For each of the
three scenarios, participants selected a donation option.
Table 2 shows how the donation options were distributed across the three scenarios in the two studies (the
middle options are highlighted in dark).
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we had 282 observations in total: ninety-four observations in the cheap scale, ninety-six in the moderate
scale, and ninety-two in the expensive scale.
Table 3: Decision positions and scale conditions
Dependent variable: Decision position
1: First

2: Middle

3: Last

Book project
5

10

15

2: Moderate

10

15

20

3: Expensive

15

20

25

1: Cheap
Independent variable: Scale condition

We defined the studies’ currency as “coins,” with
an exchange rate of 1 coin = 1 pence. Participants were
given 50 coins as a budget for each project. We designed the crowdfunding scenarios as all-or-nothing
projects, so participants were told that projects would
only be successful if a pre-defined funding goal was
reached. (They were not informed about the total
amount donated or the number of backers.) In both
studies, the book project had a funding goal of 900
coins, the video game a goal of 1,350 coins, and the
movie a goal of 1,800 coins. As participants did not
self-select into a real-life crowdfunding campaign,
there was no opt-out option, so they had to provide
funding for all projects with their 50 coins.
Payment was designed to reflect how backers experience project success (“reward”) and failure (“loss”) in
real-life crowdfunding. Therefore, participants received a participation fee of £1 and variable bonus
payments based on their donations to a randomly selected project such that, if that project was successful
(i.e., if the sum of all individual donations exceeded
the project’s funding goal), participants’ donated coins
were doubled (reward), and if the project was not successful, they lost their coins (loss). For example, if a
participant had backed a successful project with 25
coins, and if that project was randomly selected for the
bonus payment, his or her bonus payment was 75
pence (50 coins (budget) – 25 coins (donation) + 50
coins (reward) = 75 coins).
Finally, participants completed a follow-up survey
from which we collected demographic data. We used
the statistical software package R—in particular, the
package multgee for repeated-measures ordered logistic regression modelling—for data analysis [47].

Movie project
1: Cheap

10

20

30

2: Moderate

15

25

35

3: Expensive

20

30

40

1: Cheap

15

25

35

2: Moderate

20

30

40

3: Expensive

25

35

45

Video-game project

Measurement. For each project, each participant
had three donation options to choose from. We defined
the dependent variable as the position of the donation
option in the choice set (i.e., first, middle, and last).
Across all choice sets, the donation options grew more
expensive from first to last, so we coded the decision
position as an ordinal variable (1 = first, 2 = middle,
and 3 = last). The treatment (i.e., the scale condition)
was coded as a nominal variable (1 = cheap, 2 = moderate, and 3 = expensive) (Table 3). Age and gender
were used as control variables.

6. Experimental study: Price range
Participants and design. We recruited ninety-four
participants for the first study, which tested the significance of the middle-option bias for donation options
with varying price ranges (i.e., hypothesis H1a). The
mean age was 32.1 years, and 61.7 percent were men.
The experimental design was repeated-measures single-factorial, and the conditions were three scale types
of price ranges—cheap, moderate, and expensive—that
differed across projects. (That is, each participant provided funding for each of three projects—repeated
measures—in a certain condition.) For example, participants could decide to back the book project with 5, 10,
or 15 coins in the cheap-scale condition, with 10, 15, or
20 coins in the moderate-scale condition, and with 15,
20, or 25 coins in the expensive-scale condition (Table
2). We randomly assigned participants to the scale
conditions. Because of the repeated-measures design,

Figure 1. Overview of results across scenarios
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Results. Figure 1 provides histograms for the results of the experiment, aggregated across scenarios.
Forty-six of the ninety-four cheap-scale decisions were
in the middle, and participants who had either the
moderate scale or the expensive scale also tended to
choose the middle option more often than other options
(forty-seven and thirty-four decisions, respectively).
Across all scales, 45 percent of the participants chose
the middle option, as opposed to 33 percent, which
would have been expected with random selection.
Table 4. Ordered logistic regression results
Dependent variable:
Decision position (ordinal)
(1)
Treatment
(scale)

(2)

(3)

0.14
(0.15)

0.15
(0.15)

Age

-0.00
(0.01)

Gender

-0.23
(0.25)

Intercepts

01 (first | mid-

-1.05***
(0.14)

-1.33***
(0.31)

-1.00†
(0.58)

02 (middle |

last)

0.89***
(0.14)

0.62*
(0.31)

0.95†
(0.57)

Obs.

282

282

282

dle)

Notes: † p < 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001;
standard errors are in parentheses.

To test our hypothesis H1a (i.e., backers tend to
choose the donation option in the middle, independent
of the price range), we specified a repeated-measures
ordered logistic regression model. The ordinal multinomial response variable was the decision (i.e., first,
middle, last option) in the three scenarios (i.e., book,
game, movie project). As we assume that responses are
correlated (each participant selected a donation option
for each of the three projects), we fitted the following
marginal cumulative logit model [47]:
logit(ijp) = 0j + 1 Scale typei + Controlsi + ui + i,
where ijp denotes the cumulative probability of response level j (j = 1, 2 for the three decision positions;
i.e., level 1 from the first to the middle option, and
level 2 from the middle to the last option) for subject i
(i = participants 1, 2, ..., 94) and project p (p = 1, 2, 3
for the book, game, and movie, respectively). Scale
typei denotes the subject-specific treatment (i.e., the
scale condition), Controlsi are the control variables Age
and Gender, and ui is a random effect designed to capture the non-independence between the decisions (i.e.,
the outcome variable) observed for the same subject i

across the projects p (i.e., observations from the same
subject might be correlated).
Table 4 presents the results of the repeatedmeasures ordered logistic regression model. Model 1 is
an intercept-only model, Model 2 adds the scalecondition treatment, and Model 3 adds the control variables. To find support for H1a, we expect a significant
effect between the first and the middle option and between the middle and the last option (01 and 02), but
no significant effect of the treatment (i.e., the scale
condition). In other words, we expect the selected donation option to be in the middle, independent of the
scale. As predicted, 01 and 02 are significant across
all model specifications, though the significance decreases with higher price ranges (i.e., in Models 2
and 3), and the treatment has no significant effect on
the decision (Model 2: treatment = 0.14, p < 0.35; Model 3: treatment = 0.15, p < 0.32). As the treatment remains insignificant when we add the controls, we used
the simpler Model 2 for further analysis.
Table 5 shows the category probability regarding
the outcome variable (i.e., decision = 1, 2, or 3) for
Model 2. With respect to different treatment conditions, the model estimates that 44 percent would
choose the middle option.
Table 5. Category probability (Model 2)
Decision position
1: First

2: Middle

3: Last

Cumulative logit

—

-1.33

0.62

Cumulative odds
[exp(Cum.logit)]

—

0.26

1.85

Cumulative proportion
[1/1+exp(Cum.logit)]

1.00

0.79

0.35

Category probability

0.21

0.44

0.35

In conclusion, the experiment’s results indicate that
people tend to choose the donation option in the middle, independent of the price range.

7. Observational study: Number of options
Participants and design. For the second, observational study, which tested the significance of the middle-option bias for varying numbers of donation options (i.e., hypothesis H1b), we recruited another ninety-two participants. The mean age was 31.3 years, and
53.3 percent were men. To test the robustness of the
middle-option bias we observed in the first study, we
compared three, five, and seven donation options (Table 2). We assigned participants randomly to these
conditions. As with the first experiment, each participant selected a donation option for each of the three
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scenarios, resulting in another repeated-measures design. Some participants made their decisions very
quickly, which made in unlikely that they have thoroughly read and understood the project descriptions.
Therefore, we excluded those decisions from the second dataset that were made within less than fifteen
seconds. As a result, we had seventy-nine observations
for the three-options condition, eighty for the fiveoptions condition, and seventy-three for the sevenoptions condition.

Results. Figure 2 provides histograms for the results of the second study, aggregated across scenarios.
For the three-options choice set, thirty-nine out of seventy-nine decisions were in the middle, which confirmed the results of the first study (not displayed in
the figure). Participants who had the five-options
choice set also tended to choose the middle option, as
did participants who had the seven-options choice set
(twenty-three and nineteen decisions, respectively).
Table 7. Chi-square test results

Table 6: Decision positions and numbers of options
Dependent variable: Decision position
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Independent variable: Number of options

Book project
3 options
10

5 options
7 options

5

10

15

20

25

15

20

25

30

15

20

25

30 35

Movie project
15

20

25

10

15

20

25

30

10

15

20

25

30

3 options
5 options
7 options

5

35

Video-game project
15

20

25

10

15

20

25

30

10

15

20

25

30

3 options
5 options
7 options

5

35

Measurement. While our first study tested the effect of the donation-option scale (e.g., 5/10/15 vs.
10/15/20 vs. 15/25/30 coins), the second study tested
the same effect for varying numbers of donation options. We defined the dependent variable as the position of the donation option in the choice set. (That is,
participants had three options to choose from in condition 1, five options in condition 2, and seven options in
condition 3; see Table 6.)

Observations

Expected

p

3 options

79

26.33

0.00

5 options

80

16.00

0.01

7 options

73

10.43

0.00

As the dependent variable was measured on several
levels (participants had to select one out of three, five,
or seven options), we analyzed each condition separately, making it an observational study. To evaluate
the robustness of the middle-option bias with increasing numbers of donation options and to test our hypothesis H1b (i.e., backers tend to choose the donation
option in the middle, independent of the number of
options), we used the chi-square test for univariate
frequency distributions. The test determines whether
the observed values in each condition differ significantly from an expected value (i.e., the mean of each
condition). Table 7 shows the results of the chi-square
test, which support our hypothesis that people choose
the middle option more often than any other.
Table 8. Log. regression results (intercept-only models)
Dependent variable:
Decision position (ordinal)
3 options

5 options

01 (1 | 2)
02 (2 | 3)

-1.10***
(0.29)

-1.44***
(0.30)

03 (3 | 4)

-0.66*
(0.28)

-0.21
(0.21)

-0.53*
(0.24)

04 (4 | 5)

1.62***
(0.28)

1.03***
(0.20)

0.53†
(0.29)

2.94***
(0.61)

1.96***
(0.31)

05 (5 | 6)
06 (6 | 7)

Figure 2. Overview of results across scenarios
For all projects, the three-options scale was
15/20/25 coins, the five-options scale was
10/15/20/25/30 coins, and the seven-options scale was
5/10/15/20/25/30/35 coins. Accordingly, the 20-coins
option provided the middle option in all scales.

7 options
-2.41***
(0.46)

Obs.

2.24***
(0.36)
79

80

73

†

Notes: p < 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; standard
errors are in parentheses.

For each condition (i.e., 3, 5, and 7 options), we
specified a repeated-measures ordered logistic regression model, so the specification was the same as in the
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first study but did not include the treatment variable
(i.e., intercept-only models). Again, we assume that
responses are correlated, as each participant selected a
donation option for each of three projects. Table 8 presents the results of the intercept-only models, particularly the estimated log odds.
As the coefficients shown in Table 8 cannot be interpreted directly, we used the results of the repeatedmeasures ordered logistic regression model to calculate
the category probabilities (Table 9), following the
same procedure that we used in the first study. Again,
all models estimate that people tend to choose the middle option more often than any other.
Table 9. Category probabilities
Coins
5

10

15

20

25

0.34

0.49

0.16

0.25

0.20

0.29

0.21

0.05

0.11

0.18

0.26

0.25

0.03 0.10

3 options
5 options
7 options

0.08

30

35

In conclusion, the two empirical studies confirmed
participants’ tendency to choose middle options more
often than any other option, independent of both the
number of donation options and the price range.

8. Conclusions
Crowdfunding is becoming an increasingly important funding mechanism. Still, many campaigns
have remained unfunded, even though some of them
were promising and failed for other reasons than quality [31]. Against this background, researchers have an
interest in how to design and present crowdfunding
projects in a way that increases the chances of fundraising success [e.g., 22, 30, 31].
We studied fundraising success from a behavioraleconomics perspective. We drew on dual-process theory, arguing that crowdfunding backers may be prone to
System-1 processing—unconscious and quick decision-making [20] that is associated with a number of
well-known cognitive biases [48]—as projects and
rewards are often novel and innovative and lack appropriate reference points. Specifically, we studied the
middle-option bias and hypothesized that—if the reward menu is deliberately designed—backers may
choose the donation option in the middle more often
than they choose other options. Two empirical studies
in a simple, controlled environment confirmed our hypothesis.
Though this is research-in-progress, our preliminary results already have implications for practice. As
the results suggest that crowdfunding backers may be

prone to the middle-option bias, they can support project creators in designing their reward menus to maximize their chances of meeting their funding targets.
For example, they could drop low-priced rewards from
the choice set so higher-priced rewards appear in the
middle, thereby increasing the size of average donations.
However, project creators should consider that
dropping low-tier rewards from the menu may also
cause some potential funders to drop out, so they are
well-advised to use our results with caution when designing their reward menus. Related studies have suggested that higher numbers of rewards increase the
chances of fundraising success [e.g., 31]. In fact, it is
likely that the validity of the middle-option bias in reward-based crowdfunding depends on some factors
that are outside the scope of this early-stage research.
In particular, the applicability of our results has
four primary limitations. First, on most, if not all, platforms, rewards are automatically arranged from cheapest to most expensive, which prohibits the offering
from exploiting the full potential of the middle-option
bias. Second, it is likely that participants in an online
study are more prone to System-1 processing than are
actual backers who invest real money (instead of
“coins”) and receive real rewards in exchange for their
donations (instead of small bonus payments). Third, we
excluded some important individual-level variables
from our study that influence backing behavior, including personal income and preferences regarding projects
and rewards. Fourth, we studied the middle-option bias
for varying price ranges and numbers of options, but
these variations were comparatively small. If the option in the middle of a reward menu has a significantly
higher price than the others, it is also likely that the
observed effect vanishes. The same may happen when
the number of rewards is so high that backers have
difficulty finding the middle. In our experiment, for
example, the significance of the observed effect decreased with higher prices ranges.
Against this background, our findings provide only
preliminary evidence for the middle-option bias in reward-based crowdfunding. However, our early-stage
research focused on internal validity by isolating the
middle-option bias in a simple, controlled environment. To establish ecological validity, and to provide a
more realistic environment, we are developing a mock
crowdfunding website that we will use to collect further evidence for the middle-option bias and to test
alternative cognitive biases that may influence backers’
choices, including the decoy effect [45]. This, we believe, will help us to more holistically understand decision-making in crowdfunding settings and to provide a
foundation to further theorize on the design of crowdfunding projects and websites.
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